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Devoted fans and casual users of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure will feel mixed emotions on contemplating the Style Project that
aims to rewrite every rule from Rule 1 to the end. Well they might.
The Style Project's purpose is simply stated. The Civil Rules, cre-
ated in an inspired fit of creativity, have been amended repeatedly
over the years. Experience has shown that even inspired initial draft-
ing could not avoid all misadventures and that amendments drafted
by successive generations wielding different drafting tools do not al-
ways fit well. The present rules can be reworked to say more clearly
what they mean now. That is the goal of the Style Project: to translate
present text into clear language that does not change the meaning.
This simple statement demonstrates cause for both cheer and
fear. The impulses that encourage cheer are not all noble, nor are
the impulses that engender fear all ignoble. Cheer is good when it
rejoices at the prospect that the Civil Rules will become more accessi-
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
Professor Shapiro's first year as a teacher at Harvard Law School was my last year
as a student there, 1963-1964. Whatever his teaching responsibilities were, I did not
have the pleasure of being his classroom student. But another student and I took a
Law Review Note on the labor law consequences of relocating manufacturing facilities
to nonunion areas to him for a "faculty read." He was helpful and gracious, and
improved the product. Since then I have known him first through his inspired
writing and then through participation in group deliberations, most notably advisory
committees for American Law Institute projects. There is no legal-intellectual
exercise more stimulating than an ALI advisers meeting, and of them none can match
those in which Professor Shapiro participates. He is one of the small number whom
we all should aspire to emulate, even if not to match.
I have the great good fortune to serve as Reporter for the United States Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These
comments on the Style Project grow out of that experience. They do not reflect in
any way the views of the Advisory Committee or the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, to which it reports.
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ble, conveying unchanged meaning more clearly and more efficiently.
Cheer is not so good when it springs from hope that change can be
manipulated to partisan advantage in ways that never were intended.
Fear is unworthy when it mourns loss of the opportunity to twist am-
biguous or opaque language or loss of the advantages that inhere in
mastering the arcane. Fear commands greater respect when it cau-
tions that great care must be taken to reduce the inevitable missteps
that either change present meaning or encourage costly but failing
arguments for changed meaning.
These notes focus primarily on the grounds for caution, hoping
to stimulate all Civil Rules constituents to engage actively in reviewing
the restyled rules when they are published for comment.1 Every
rule-perhaps even Rule 22-has its constituency. Unrelenting exam-
ination by everyday users will contribute greatly to the Style Project's
success. Even simple proposals are improved time and again by public
comment, and complex proposals may be transformed or abandoned
altogether. Ferreting out unintended changes will require diligent
and devoted work by hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of volunteer
participants.
The grounds for optimism also may stimulate comments of a kind
all too rare in the general run of public comment and testimony on
proposed rules amendments. For the most part, few comments are
made by observers who agree that a proposed amendment is sound.
Why bother to tell the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee
that they have gotten it right for the reasons they give? But approving
comments are in fact valuable. Confirmation of committee judgments
by others, speaking from diverse backgrounds and experiences, places
other comments in better perspective. Yet there is little need to ex-
plore the grounds for optimism here. The Appellate Rules and Crimi-
nal Rules have been restyled successfully. 3 The Civil Rules project is
supported not only by the success of those projects but by the lessons
learned in bringing them to successful conclusions. The legions of
experts involved in the Style Project believe in the Project's inevitable
success and bolster their belief by attending carefully to the many
cautions.
The Style Project has progressed to a point that supports identifi-
cation of many general questions that have been faced and tentatively
1 The present goal is to publish the restyled rules in one set, perhaps as soon as
February 2005.
2 "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" FED. R. Civ.
P. 2.
3 The restyled Appellate Rules took effect on December 1, 1998. The restyled
Criminal Rules took effect on December 1, 2002.
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answered. But the answers remain tentative. This survey is offered in
the hope of advancing the understanding of those who will comment
on the restyled rules as they are published. Understanding may bring
fresh insights that require reconsideration of postulates that have
framed the current drafts. Surely it will bring better focused sugges-
tions for specific improvements.
If there is any logic to order the questions, it is implicit in the
reactions of those who confront the Style Project for the first time.
The first set of reactions put the challenge directly: it is not possible to
accomplish the intended purpose. Any meaningful improvement of
style will change meaning. The second set of reactions pose narrower
questions that, narrow as they may be, stir surprisingly vehement
emotions.
I. CAN IT BE DONE?
The central challenge is easy to make and not easy to meet. At
one fundamental level, it turns the very premise of the Style Project
against itself. Improved clarity changes meaning. Even if the change
brings meaning-in-application closer to original intent, the result still
is change. And it is impossible to pretend that the only change is to
reach the same result faster, with less costly dispute. Actual outcomes
will change. The challenge is expressed almost universally when prac-
ticing lawyers hear of the Style Project. Lawyers tend to express direct,
pragmatic objections. More conceptual objections, expressed in
colder academic language, run parallel.
Satisfactory responses to these challenges may be postponed for
an expanded statement of the challenges.
A. The Pragmatic Lawyer Challenge
Almost universally, practicing lawyers react to descriptions of the
Style Project with vehement negatives. These reactions can be dis-
counted as familiar expressions of the conservative instincts that com-
monly set the bar against procedural change. The discount rate,
however, may not be high. On some future December 1, the profes-
sion will confront an entire set of newly expressed rules. For some
time, it will be common to remember that the new rules are intended
to bear the same meanings as the rules they replace. Confronting the
uncertainties that emerge from the new rules, resort will be had to the
old familiar rules on the theory that the meaning has not changed.
When the former meaning was unclear or disputed, comparisons of
the texts will at times generate new confusions. And many a lawyer,
knowing full well what is intended, will seek adversary advantage by
2004] 1763
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contending for different meanings supported by different texts. That
will be the initial phase. As time passes, more and more questions will
be addressed by considering only the new rule texts. Language that
clearly expresses earlier meaning will be pushed and pulled to find
new meanings. Often-perhaps almost always-the meanings in-
tended by the stylists will prevail. But the costs of transitory uncer-
tainty will be paid for many years.
This pragmatic challenge would suggest that a style project
should be carried out slowly, stretched out over the many years that
would be required to reconsider not only the style but also the mean-
ing of each rule. Incremental consideration would ensure full under-
standing of each rule as it is scrutinized, achieving the best expression
that can emerge only from resolution of all apparent substantive ques-
tions. The individuals and bar groups who comment on proposed
changes would be able to focus attention and provide help far greater
than can be achieved when confronted with a complete set of restyled
rules in a single package. Incremental implementation would enable
lawyers and judges to focus on discrete areas as they arise, without
need to continually recheck every familiar procedural question to
learn whether ingrained understandings have been displaced by clear
expression of a different understanding.
The thought of stretching the Style Project out over many years
was rejected on grounds as pragmatic as the doubts that spurred the
thought. Sheer Advisory Committee fatigue was one concern. It is
possible to maintain energetic engagement over a period of a few
years, but a longer project would gradually lose its claim to undivided
attention as other business came to the forefront. Changing Advisory
Committee membership is another concern. Uniform conventions
must be adopted and adhered to, but they must first be fought out.
Written expression is too personal, and personal convictions too pas-
sionate, to admit of unanimous opinion. New members will resist the
convention compromises, and at times might subvert them. Periodic
packages commingling style and substantive changes, moreover,
would lose the focus that will be forced by adoption of a complete
package. No matter how many committee notes conclude with the
observation that changes other than those described are sylistic only,
still greater room would be allowed for the adversary impulse to wring
meaning out of every new word or comma.
B. Structure, Punctuation, and Words
The pragmatic challenge is made easier when it focuses on the
means adopted to increase clarity. One method is simply to break a
1764 [VOL- 79:5
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long provision into constituent parts-a single paragraph is divided
into subparagraphs, and so on. If there is no change in words or
punctuation, the argument of "pure clarity" is fairly persuasive. But
punctuation changes are risky. And word changes are quite another
story.
Punctuation difficulties frequently arise from commas. Different
drafters over the years have used-and not used-commas in differ-
ent ways. One illustration will do: present Rule 5(a) requires service
of "[e]very order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
.... every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party .... every written motion .... and every written notice, appear-
ance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal,
and similar paper."'4 "Similar paper"? Similar to what? To orders that
must be served, papers relating to discovery, and so on? Or only to
the final group-"written notice, appearance, demand," and so on?
The Style Project, by introducing paragraphs and subparagraphs,
makes an unambiguous choice. "Similar paper" is connected only to
the group that begins with "written notice." The choice seems right.
But it is a choice, an interpretation of the present rule that might be
debated. Multiplying these choices throughout the rules must inevita-
bly require some close calls.
Word changes are still more uncertain. Never mind what the dic-
tionary may say. No two words are precise synonyms. That's why we
have so many. That's why rules drafters insist that we resist the literary
aspiration to express the same thought in different words when it
reappears. Only monotonous consistency is safe. That's why it is not
possible to fully realize the Style Project's ambition to substitute new
words for old, expressing present meaning more clearly but without
change.
C. Intractable Ambiguity
Better expression of unchanged meaning, intrinsically difficult,
becomes impossible when present meaning is obscure. A scribe who
does not know what the rule means now cannot make a clear state-
ment without risking change. This problem could be approached by
undertaking exhaustive research, but there are enough of these
problems to exhaust even a substantial number of dedicated research-
ers. And there is no assurance that exhaustive research will resolve
the ambiguity. Present Rule 32(a), for example, begins by invoking
"the rules of evidence" and then, in paragraph (1), immediately
4 FED. R. CIv. P. 5(a).
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switches to "the Federal Rules of Evidence."'5 Does the first phrase
refer only to the Federal Rules of Evidence? May a federal court, for
that matter, apply rules of evidence that cannot somehow be
anchored in a Federal Rule of Evidence? Should a Style Project ex-
pend great effort in seeking the advice of evidence experts?
Present Rule 4(h)(1) provides another example. Service on a
corporation can be made by serving an "agent authorized... by law to
receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by stat-
ute ... and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defen-
dant."'6 Is there a difference between authorization by law and
authorization by statute? How might the difference be better
expressed?
As these choices multiply, the solution often has been to carry
present language forward without change. The only alternative would
be multiple projects, parallel to the Style Project, to determine the
best meaning, whether or not it is the present meaning. And that
alternative, dragging out over generations of Advisory Committee and
Standing Committee members, could easily defeat the entire project.
Ambiguity nowhere presents a more pervasive problem than
arises from "shall." "Shall" permeates the rules. The lengthy commit-
tee discussions of its universal problems are summarized separately
below.
D. An Isolated Island of Good Drafting May Lose the Common Language
Another challenge may be largely fanciful. For better or worse,
lawyers and courts are condemned to struggle continually with bad
drafting. Focusing only on positive enactments, some bad drafting is
deliberate. Unable to resolve a conflict, contending forces negotiate a
deliberately ambiguous resolution to focus future battles in other are-
nas. Other bad drafting results from failure to understand the prob-
lem addressed or to foresee future developments. Yet another cause
arises from the inability of even the best drafter, choosing words that
perfectly express the thought in mind, to understand how those words
may bear on thoughts not yet thought. And, alas, some drafters may
not rise to the top levels of skill and experience.
In this sea of indifferent drafting, elegant drafting stands apart.
It seems fair to ask whether the precise language used in a small world
may become insular. It does not matter whether it is the fine drafting
language that drifts away from common usage, or common usage that
drifts. Communication requires common ground. Lawyers and
5 FED. R. COv. P. 32(a).
6 FED. R. Cv. P. 4(h)(1) (emphasis added).
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judges accustomed to wading through inelegant drafting may be un-
willing to believe the evidence of their intellects, unable to resist argu-
ments that confuse and depart because they work with so many texts
that invite confusion and departure. This possible concern, however,
is troubling only if clear expression generates greater confusion than
unclear expression. Although possible, that prospect seems unlikely.
Greater risks arise from the prospect that professional drafters
may turn inward so completely as to lose touch with the effect their
words have on others. Present Rule 8(b) offers a simple example. It
says that a denial "shall fairly meet the substance of the averment[ ]
denied."7 Style Draft Rule 8(b) (2) directs that a denial "fairly re-
spond" to the substance.8 "Respond" is a nice, clear, modern word. It
also claims a pedigree in the present rules-Rule 15 (a), for example,
refers to a "responsive pleading."9 "Meet" has an antique ring to it.
But it also carries a stronger force than "respond." It suggests direct,
head-on confrontation in a way that "respond" does not. Over time,
substitution of "respond" may subtly weaken whatever force there may
be in this rather wishful pleading direction.
E. Pragmatic Possibilities
The assertion that the Style Project cannot succeed without
changing the meaning of some rules, even several rules, need not de-
feat the project. One justification may be that the overall gains will
yield greater benefit than the occasional changes. This cost-benefit
balance cannot be predicted with confidence. Even a decade or two
of applying restyled rules may yield no more than impressionistic and
anecdotal evidence. Optimism seems appropriate, but pessimists can-
not be swayed by the simple charms of optimism. Deeper justifica-
tions, however, can be found to support the Style Project. An
enigmatic summary may introduce the discussion. All of the present
meanings of all of the Civil Rules are simply way-stations along the
road from original intent to better understanding. Meanings will
change if there is no Style Project at all. The Style Project would be a
disaster if-against all odds-it actually should succeed in freezing the
"present meaning" of every rule. What good it can do will be to chan-
nel the inevitable changes into more desirable directions.
The Civil Rules have an evolutionary quality that infuses them
with common law elements. Much of this quality is deliberate. Time
7 FED. R. Crv. P. 8(b).
8 STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (STYLE 277), at 23 (2003).
9 FED. R. CIrv. P. 15(a).
2004] 1767
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and again, the rules rely on district court discretion. Discretion may
be exercised in ways that defy any pattern, responding to diverse cir-
cumstances with diverse answers that could not be captured in more
directing language, even if reason appeared to eliminate occasional
wayward applications. And if present "meaning" could be captured in
words, the effort might cripple desirable adaptations as still different
circumstances appear. A Style Project can do no more in these areas
than to ensure that the rule does not misdirect discretion. Present
rule language and new style language alike will yield the same results
as judges respond sensibly to the problems that confront them. The
style effort risks little harm and may eliminate language quirks that
occasionally interfere with wise discretion.
Common law evolution of procedure is not limited to inventive
exercise of discretion deliberately conferred. Intended meaning may
be superseded as practice shows a better way. This phenomenon will
reduce at least two risks that inhere in the attempt to restate original
intended meaning. The risk more commonly noted is that the style
drafters will misunderstand original meaning. That risk implies an
unflattering view of present drafting, but in itself supports the argu-
ment for redrafting. A less polite and less often expressed intended-
meaning risk is that courts can improve on the original meaning, and
should not be bound to it by language that brooks no escape. This
risk implies an unflattering view of original intent. However often
each risk will be realized by the style drafters, common law evolution
will frequently come to the rescue. Just as courts read the present
rules to mean what they should mean, so will courts read the restyled
rules.
One example illuminates the healing abilities of the common law
interpretation process. As amended in 1970, what has come to be des-
ignated as Rule 33(c) offers this singularly useless advice: "An interro-
gatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because
an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that
relates to fact or the application of law to fact."10 "Necessarily" could
have been interjected in this sentence only to indicate that the inter-
rogatory may be objectionable merely for this reason, but then again
it may not be objectionable merely for this reason. It all depends, and
we will not tell you what it depends on. You, the lawyers and judges,
must figure that out on your own. But, just to make sure that you are
sufficiently troubled, we will provide advice in the Committee Note
that the interrogatory "is not" objectionable." No "necessarily" about
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c).
11 Id. 33(b) advisory committee's note (1970 amend.).
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it. Further inquiry would reveal that the Committee Note was written
to support a draft rule that said that the interrogatory is not objection-
able. 12 "Necessarily" was intruded after the original drafting, without
explanation or guidance. Confronted with this sorry spectacle, the
current Style Project proposal is to delete "necessarily." The justifica-
tion for this change invokes a useful guide through the style maze. A
rule may be made to say what it has come to mean in practice, no
matter how at odds practice may be with the apparent meaning of
present text. In practice, "necessarily" is ignored. 13 So it can be de-
leted from the style rule.
Concerns that restyling may reduce desirable evolution may be
further assuaged by reflecting that much evolution occurs without
close consultation of rules texts. It may be that most applications of
the Civil Rules are made from vague memory, without constant re-
newal by consulting the actual text. But quick consultations occur
with great frequency as well. Clear text expression need not impede
the creative responses to living problems that emerge from this pro-
cess. Clarity indeed may improve understanding and application
where they count most, in myriad acts and decisions made from
residual impressions or after reading on the run. And clarity also will
help in the less frequent situations that call for and can support care-
ful reading.
With or without a Style Project, the rules will continue to take on
new meanings as courts confront circumstances not contemplated by
"original intent" and at times-for better or occasionally for worse-
will depart from original intent. A Style Project that refrains from de-
liberate tinkering, that seeks only to express present meaning as
clearly as possible, will advance this goal. Applications that depart
from the results that would have been reached under present lan-
guage are more likely to be improvements than mistakes. Yes, mean-
ings will change. But that is no reason to surrender the project.
II. How SHOULD IT BE DONE?
Commitment to restyle the rules without deliberate changes in
meaning entails commitment to act with great care. Beyond that fun-
damental approach, however, many choices remain open. Often the
12 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRO-
POSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS RELATING TO DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY 61 (1967).
13 See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE OF PROCEDURE, STYLE DRAF'r OF
RULES 26 THROUGH 37 AND 45, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (STYLE 458), at
38-39 (2003).
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choices should be made with an eye to acceptance of the restyled rules
package when it takes effect. Some measure of elegance may properly
be sacrificed to carry forward rules features that are familiar and com-
fortable. Yet some measure of discomfort should be tolerated. Al-
though painful, forced confrontation with new expressions of old
principles will bring new and better understandings. A number of the
more general choices to be made are described here to illustrate myr-
iad more specific issues that demand unremitting attention as the
Style Project proceeds.
A. Structure
The structure of the whole Civil Rules package is at times eccen-
tric. Summaryjudgment is a pretrial device, but it appears as Rule 56
in the chapter dealing with judgments.14 It might make better sense
to locate it after the discovery rules and before the trial rules. Rule 16,
for that matter, occupies an odd place between the pleading rules and
the party- and claim-joinder rules. The counterclaim, crossclaim, and
third-party claim rules 15 seem to fit better between Rule 18 and Rule
19 than in their present place. Aesthetic improvements might be
made by rethinking the basic structure.
One advantage of restructuring would be that we would be free to
adopt, at least for the time being, a set of whole-number designations.
No more Rule 4.1, 23.2, or 71A. We would no longer need to jump
from Rule 73 to Rule 77.
These proposals almost inevitably will be-and so far have
been-defeated by the familiarity of Rule 56, Rule 13(a), and so on.
The conservative inertia that has slowed procedural reform applies to
the small as well as the large. Although the bar managed to survive
renumbering of some of the discovery rules by the 1970 amendments,
it will cling to Rule 9(b) to identify the standard for pleading fraud
with particularity, 16 to Rule 12(b)(6) to identify a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,' 7 and so
on. As compared to the daring of those who developed the 1970 dis-
covery amendments, moreover, the march of research techniques pro-
vides a further argument for retaining familiar designations. The
most enthusiastic opponents of change will argue that no present des-
ignation can change, not ever, because that will complicate computer
searches.
14 FED. R. Crw. P. 56.
15 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 16.
16 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
1770 [VOL. 79:5
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A much smaller-scale version of the structure question arises
when good style would rearrange subdivisions within a rule, or per-
haps combine two or more subdivisions. The computer-search cham-
pions may not forestall such rearrangements of rules whose subparts
have not developed entrenched reflexes. Rearrangement in turn
poses a still smaller question: if we combine subdivision (b) with sub-
division (c), do we continue to describe subdivision (d) as "(d)," show-
ing (c) as "abrogated," or do we re-letter (d) as new (c)?
Structure is further involved in one of the basic techniques to
improve present style. Rule 14(a), perhaps more than any other rule,
illustrates the gains that can be made by the simple device of breaking
a single long subdivision into paragraphs, subparagraphs, and items.






Occasionally a rule might be easier to follow if we had further
designations-if after the subparagraph (A) we could have one more
sequence of numbers and letters. But there are several arguments
against adding further designations. One is conformity to other sets
of rules. Another is the need to find words to describe them: sub-
subparagraph is unattractive, and the alternatives may be worse. The
inset technique may be another. It facilitates clarity, in part because it
increases the volume of "white space" on the page. But at some point
insetting may restrain the further proliferation of subparts. The temp-
tation to break an item down into still smaller subparts is tempered by
the very short lines that result.
B. Sacred Phrases
Some phrases in the present rules govern common problems,
have become embedded in professional lore, and generate volumes of
interpretations. Many of these phrases have acquired nearly sacred
status, in part because of the nearly mystical qualities used to invoke
functional principles that are not easily expressed in authoritative lan-
guage. These sacred phrases should carry forward in the restyled
rules. "Transaction or occurrence" will still be used to define the rela-
tionships that make a counterclaim compulsory under Rule 13(a).18
It would be dangerous to yield to the temptation to adopt the "logical
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
2004 ] 1771
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relationship" test that many courts use to explain the authoritative
text in frustration with the elusiveness of the official phrase.19 One
challenge will be to ensure that all of the phrases that have taken on
such settled elaborations are preserved.
Retaining sacred phrases raises the question whether the Style
Project must pursue uniform expression by reexamining the varia-
tions that encumber the familiar phrases. "Transaction or occur-
rence" persists from Rule 13 into Rule 14 up to 14(c), where it
becomes "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences. '20 In Rule 15(c) (2) it becomes "conduct, transaction, or oc-
currence. '21 By Rule 20 it expands back to "transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences." 22 But Rule 20 adds some-
thing new: parties may be joined if a right to relief is asserted "in re-
spect of' as well as "arising out of' the transaction. 23 What subtle
distinctions may be implied by these variations? Perhaps this is the
point: each of these phrases is used because the drafters do not know
precisely what they intend and seek to rely on common-sense develop-
ment over time. They do know, however, that it is quite unlikely that
the same tests should be used for compulsory counterclaims, (permis-
sive) crossclaims, third-party impleader, relation back of pleading
amendments, or permissive partyjoinder. So they hop, somewhat pe-
culiarly, from one phrase to another as a means of signaling the need
for distinctive approaches. It would be a mistake to settle on one com-
mon phrase for each of these rules.
C. Definitions
Definitions presented recurring difficulties in the Criminal Rules
style project. As later rules were styled, the Crimimal Rules Commit-
tee was driven to consider again and again the definitions adopted in
earlier rules. There are more definitions in the Civil Rules than many
of us realize. Rule 3 defines what it means to "commence" an ac-
tion.24 The Rule 5(e) tag line is "Filing with the Court Defined,"25 but
the rule does not really define filing-it directs how filing is to be
accomplished. 26 At the same time, it does deFtne an electronic "pa-
19 See 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410,
at 61-65 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing case usage of the logical relationship test).
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
22 FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a).
23 Id.
24 See FED. R. Clv. P. 3.
25 FED. R. Crv. P. 5(e).
26 See id.
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per" as "written paper."2 7 Rule 7 defines what is a "pleading."28 Bur-
ied in Rule 28(a) is a definition of "officer" for purposes of Rules 30,
31, and 32.29 The Rule 54(a) definition of 'judgment" presents ques-
tions so horrendous that the Committee quickly abandoned any at-
tempt even to think about them in the recent revision of Rule 58.30
The District of Columbia is made a "state" by Rule 81 (e), "if appropri-
ate.13 1 Rule 81 (f) sets out a curiously limited definition of "officer" of
the United States (including, at least on its face, a beginning that in-
cludes reference to an "agency," followed by a definition only of "of-
ficer").32 Other definitions may lurk in the rules. We may be stuck
with the ones we have, except to the extent that substantive amend-
ments may be made in parallel with the Style Project. But the present
rules suggest reasons to be wary of adding new definitions.
D. "Legacy" Provisions
As astonishing as it was, the achievement represented by adoption
of the Civil Rules was rooted in the past. The rules continue to reject
a history that in 1938 still threatened to become the future. The rules
have flourished, and the history is increasingly forgotten. The Style
Project must consider the opportunity to abandon provisions that ex-
pressly abolish long-gone procedures, supersede vanished distinctions,
and rely on expressions that are familiar to lawyers but seem quaint or
deliberately obscuring to others.
1. Old Practices Abolished
The Civil Rules have abolished many earlier procedural devices.
The generic question is whether it is necessary to continue to abolish
these devices forever. Specific answers may vary.
Rule 7(c) is an example: "(c) Demurrers, Pleas, etc., Abolished.
Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading shall
not be used. ' 33 We could spend some time debating whether devices
are "abolished" by a rule that says only that they shall not be used. But
why not abandon this subdivision entirely? Even if someone decides
to describe an act as a demurrer rather than a Rule 12(b) (6) motion
to dismiss, a 12(c) motion to strike an insufficient defense, a Rule
27 Id.
28 FED. R. Crv. P. 7(a).
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a).
30 See CIVL RULES ADVISORY COMM., DRAr MINUTES, APR. 2000, at 15-20.
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (e).
32 FED. R. Crv. P. 81(f).
33 FED. R. Crv. P. 7(c).
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50(a) motion forjudgment as a matter of law, or whatever, the court is
likely to understand and respond appropriately.
A more familiar example is Rule 60(b), but it may be more com-
plex. The final sentence says: "Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis,
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action. '34 This rule does abolish something. We may
wonder whether there is much risk that a modern lawyer will think to
reinvent these archaic procedures. Perhaps there is-the criminal law
crowd continues to have questions about the persistence of coram nobis
relief.35 However that may be, the last part of the sentence is a spe-
cific direction: relief from ajudgment must be sought by motion or by
independent action. We may need to keep that. (And perhaps to
note that an appeal-surely neither a motion as prescribed in these
rules nor an independent action-is not what we mean by "relief from
a judgment"?)
A less familiar example is Rule 81 (b), which abolishes the writs of
scirefacias and mandamus.3 6 Most lawyers would need a dictionary to
learn what scirefacias might be,37 and it would require more than the
usual measure of adversary gall to attempt its resurrection as an inde-
pendent procedural device. Congress, on the other hand, has revived
mandamus; Rule 81(b) has been superseded in part by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (2000).38 This Rule 81 (b) paragraph seems safely deleted.
2. Old Distinctions Superseded
Less direct means may be used to supersede old practices. Rule 1
is a fine example: "These rules govern the procedure in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
35 See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 592, at
685 (3d ed. 2004). A demonstration that audita querela has survived formal abolition
is provided by Ejelonu v. INS, 355 F.3d 539, 544-48 (6th Cir. 2004).
36 FED. R. Ctv. P. 81(b).
37 Scirefacias "denotes the judicial writ (which contained these words) founded
upon a matter of record requiring the person against whom it is issued to show cause
either why the record should not be annulled or vacated, or why a dormantjudgment
against that person should not be revived." BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MOD-
ERN LEGAL USAGE 783 (2d ed. 1995).
38 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000).
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cases at law or in equity or in admiralty .... ,,39 "Suits"? "Of a civil
nature"? "Cases" at law or in equity or in admiralty? The merger of
law and equity was accomplished in 1938; admiralty was brought into
the fold in 1966. Is there a risk that the merger will dissolve without
continued support in Rule 1? Whether or not we continue express
merger, can "civil action" be substituted for "suits" and "cases"? This
seemingly modest question illustrates the variety of sources that might
be consulted and the array of answers they might suggest. A very
quick look at the subject-matter jurisdiction statutes that begin at 28
U.S.C. § 1330 shows that "civil action" is the most common expres-
sion.40 But § 1333 refers to "any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction";41 § 1334(a) refers to "cases" under tide 11;42 § 1334(b)
refers to "civil proceedings arising under title 11"; 4 3 § 1337 refers to
"any civil action or proceeding";44 § 1345, covering the United States
as plaintiff, refers to "all civil actions, suits or proceedings";45
§ 1346(a)(2)-the Little Tucker Act-refers to "[a]ny other civil ac-
tion or claim against the United States";46 § 1351 refers to "all civil
actions and proceedings" against consuls, etc.; 47 § 1352 refers to "any
action on a bond";48 § 1354 to "actions between citizens of the same
state";49 § 1355 to "any action or proceeding";50 § 1356 to "any
seizure"; 51 § 1358 to "all proceedings to condemn real estate";52 and
§ 1361 to "any action in the nature of mandamus."53 New Rule 7.1 (a)
refers to an "action or proceeding." Perhaps that is the phrase that
should appear in Rule 1. But even that phrase will leave the question
whether some district court events are excluded from direct applica-
tion of the Civil Rules because they are not actions or proceedings.54
39 FED. R. Clv. P. 1.
40 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1368 (detailing jurisdiction of U.S. District Courts).
41 Id. § 1333.
42 Id. § 1334(a).
43 Id. § 1334(b).
44 Id. § 1337(a).
45 Id. § 1345.
46 Id. § 1346(a) (2).
47 Id. § 1351.
48 Id. § 1352.
49 Id. § 1353.
50 Id. § 1355.
51 Id. § 1356.
52 Id. § 1358.
53 Id. § 1361.
54 SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2003), ruled that an "application"
by the SEC to enforce an SEC order that in turn enforced National Association of
Securities Dealers' sanction orders is not a "suit[ I of a civil nature" governed by the
Civil Rules. The opinion promptly switched to asking whether the proceeding is an
2004 ] 1775
HeinOnline  -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1775 2003-2004
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
3. Familiar Terms and Concepts
The present rules embrace many terms long embedded in legal
discourse. Rule 4(1) provides for "proof of service. '55 Even a lawyer
who does not know how to prove service knows the phrase to research.
The rule could as easily say that service must be proved to the court.
But why abandon a familiar and well understood term, substituting a
phrase that may generate arguments that a different process is. con-
templated? There may be times when we should not abandon a well
understood term simply because it seems somehow archaic.
Familiarity goes beyond language to concept. Justice Jackson put
it well: "It is true that the literal language of the Rules would admit of
an interpretation that would sustain the district court's order.... But
all such procedural measures have a background of custom and prac-
tice which was assumed by those who wrote and should be by those
who apply them."56 As time moves on, however, the shared back-
ground of custom and practice may fade away. Reading a rule today,
we may fail to understand the intended meaning, and in rewriting
seemingly clear language effect a change. An illustration is the provi-
sion in Rule 19(a) that a necessary party plaintiff "may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff."57 It is easy to
pick this illustration because it is familiar-courts have generally pre-
served the understanding that the "proper case" is much more re-
stricted than the words might indicate.58 The more meaningful
illustrations will be those that we overlook because the original under-
standing has been lost. The ignorant assumption of a new meaning
and its expression in contemporary style may be an improvement, but
it still will be a change.
E. Ambiguities
First-time participants in style discussions are invariably surprised
to discover ambiguities lurking in familiar rules that seemed to be well
"action." Id. at 656. Section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)
(2000), establishes district court jurisdiction, on "application" by the SEC, to order
compliance with the rules of a registered securities association. An application is a
summary proceeding, not an action. "Even words with remarkably similar definitions
can still convey a unique or distinct meaning or flavor from words that are similar or
even synonymous in nature because of their differing tone or usage within a sen-
tence." McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656.
55 FED. R. Crv. P. 4(1).
56 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
57 FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a).
58 See 7 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1605-1606, at 69-84 (3d ed. 2001).
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understood. The general problem has been described in addressing
the reasons to accept the prospect that the Style Project will, at times,
change the meaning of a present rule.5 9 More specific problems may
be illustrated in two sets. The first involves the ubiquitous use of
"shall" as a word of command. The second involves the habit of quali-
fying words of direction or command by references to discretion, jus-
tice, and other lofty principles.
1. Shall
Bryan Garner devotes more than three double-column pages to
"Words of Command," saying "these verbs are a horrific muddle" and
excoriating "shall" as "[t]he primary problem."60 His preferred solu-
tion is to use "must" to mean "is required to."61 The Style Project has
adopted this solution, adhering to the lead set by the Appellate Rules
and the Criminal Rules. Official adoption has not stilled dissent.
"Shall" is used with monotonous regularity throughout the rules.
Often it is safely translated as "must," but time and again, translation is
made difficult by the very ambiguity that brings "shall" into disrepute.
The arguments have grown increasingly sophisticated. It is useful to
consider the views expressed during more than an hour of vigorous
discussion at the October 2003 meeting of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee. 62
Succinct summary may adequately capture the discussion. "Shall"
has become a word of "soft command." It has imperative overtones,
but often preserves some measure of discretion. As compared to
"must," "shall" does not seem as likely to confer rights on litigants. It
is not possible to unravel its ambiguities to reconstruct a clear present
meaning or original intent in all applications. Indeed the original
drafters of one rule or another amendment may deliberately have re-
lied on the ambiguity of "shall." The determination to adopt "must"
to mean "is required to" closes off the opportunity to carry ambiguity
forward by carrying forward present rule language. There is a real risk
that meaning will be changed in choosing whether to substitute
"must," "may," or "should" for "shall." This risk may occur even when
it is clear that "shall" was originally intended to mean "must." Actual
practice may have added some measure of discretion. The dilution of
59 See supra Part I.C.
60 GARNER, supra note 37, at 939-42. After identifying eight meanings within the
range of subtle shadings, Garner recognizes that any strong word of command will
foster litigation so long as the consequences of disobedience are open to argument.
61 See id.
62 See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., DRAFT MINUTES, Ocr. 2003.
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the original command may reflect that practice has shown a better
way: discretion is more useful, even more important, than the drafters
understood.
Rule 37(b) (2) provides one example among many. It provides a
long and formidable list of sanctions a court may impose for dis-
obeying a discovery order. Then it concludes:
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attor-
ney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds
that the failure was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust.63
Should "shall" become "must"? The 1970 committee notes re-
flect an intent to prompt more frequent use of expense sanctions.64
But there is broad discretionary authority to deny expenses on finding
substantial justification or unjustness. Many judges and lawyers be-
lieve that the intent in 1970, whatever it was, has not led to widespread
use of expense sanctions. If "shall" is converted to "must," will the
result be more frequent imposition of expense sanctions? Is that a
good thing, despite widespread reluctance? And if that brings prac-
tice closer to original intent, is it proper to use the Style Project to
change meaning in practice for this purpose?
2. Words to Measure Discretion
The rules often seek to guide or confine discretion by adding
words that seem to measure the discretion. A few random samples
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (emphasis added).
64 See FED. R. Crv. P. 37 advisory committee's note (1970 amend.). Most of the
discussion is directed to Rule 37(a)(4). The former rule called for an expense sanc-
tion if the losing party acted without substantial justification. The amendment called
for the sanction unless the losing party's behavior was substantially justified. The
Committee explained that the former provision "may appear adequate, but in fact it
has been little used.... It appears that the courts do not utilize the most important
available sanction to deter abusive resort to the judiciary." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (4).
The final paragraph states that "expenses should ordinarily be awarded," but that "a
necessary flexibility is maintained. ... The amendment does not significantly narrow
the discretion of the court, but rather presses the court to address itself to abusive
practices." Id. Turning to 37(b)(2), the note observes that the rule
places the burden on the disobedient party to avoid expenses by showing
that his failure is justified or that special circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust. Allocating the burden in this way conforms to the changed
provisions as to expenses in Rule 37(a), and is particularly appropriate when
a court order is disobeyed.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) advisory committee's note.
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include Rule 6(b): "the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion" enlarge time limits; 65 Rule 13(f): the court may grant leave
to set up an omitted counterclaim "when justice requires"; 66 Rule
15(d): the court may permit a supplemental pleading "upon such
terms as are just";67 Rule 37(b) (2): the court "may make such or-
ders ... as are just" when a party disobeys a discovery order.68 Other
rules confer discretion without the embellishments. Rule 23(f) says
that a court of appeals "may in its discretion" permit appeal from an
order granting or denying class-action certification; 69 Rule 49(a) says
that a court "may require ajury to return only a special verdict";70 and
Rule 49(b) says that the court "may submit" interrogatories with a gen-
eral verdict. 71
The style question is whether to invoke discretion simply by say-
ing that a court "may" do something, without attempting to invoke
justice, "cause," "discretion," or like terms. Exclusive reliance on
"may" makes sense only if language cannot be used to express the
many subtle gradations of discretion that abound in procedure. The
argument is that the breadth and depth of district court discretion
should be worked out in practice by the courts of appeals, without
attempting to give clues in rules texts. But it may not be an accident
that court of appeals discretion under Rule 23(f) was deliberately left
without bounds.72 The choice whether to use a Rule 49 verdict is simi-
larly confided to unlimited district court discretion; it is difficult to
imagine circumstances in which refusal to use a Rule 49 verdict is in
itself reversible error.73 "May" in these rules means full discretion.
The other rules used as examples, moreover, confer narrower discre-
tion. Although degrees of discretion are not easily expressed, nor for
that matter clearly foreseen, some hints can be given by exacting
cause, by invoking justice, or by employing similar terms.
To complicate matters, the Style Project must choose expressions
of discretion in the context of rewriting present rules. If the goal is
only to express present meaning, it is risky to rely on "may" alone to
65 FED. R. Crv. P. 6(b).
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f).
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
68 FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2).
69 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f).
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
72 The 1998 committee note states that appeal "is permitted in the sole discretion
of the court of appeals .... The court of appeals is given unfettered discretion . . .
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (1998 amend.).
73 See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2505,
at 161 (2d ed. 1994).
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describe every matter of discretion. References will be made con-
stantly to earlier decisions describing the boundaries of discretion
and, through the decisions, to the present rules. Whatever might be
the best choice in writing an entirely new and independent set of
rules, caution may be the wise course in restyling the present rules.
F Substantive Change
Oft-repeated meticulous review of every word in every rule is an
essential part of the Style Project. This process inevitably brings to
mind old dissatisfactions and generates new doubts. The Style Pro-
ject, however, has been framed to resist all temptations. Deliberate
substantive changes, even slight changes, must be addressed by other
means.
The proposal to amend Rule 27(a)(2) published in August
200374 is a good illustration. Rule 27(a) (2) now provides that notice
of the hearing on a petition to perpetuate testimony must be served
"in the manner provided in Rule 4(d) for service of summons and
complaint. '' 75 Rule 4 has been revised and Rule 4(d) now provides for
waiver of service.76 Other changes to Rule 4 make it impossible to
reconstruct precisely the effect of the reference to former Rule 4(d).
Although the arguments for referring to all of Rule 4 seem persuasive,
the change will expand the former meaning. The amendment was
pulled out of the Style Project and published as a substantive change.
The best means to address the substantive questions that emerge
from the Style Project remain to be resolved. Although the project
commands a substantial share of Advisory Committee time and re-
sources, independent projects continue to be pursued. 77 The tenta-
tive approach to substantive proposals emerging from the Style
Project is to accumulate them in a separate portfolio. As the style pro-
74 STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CML, AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82-84 (2003).
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(2).
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
77 The agenda for the October 2-3, 2003, meeting provides examples. In addi-
tion to Style Project questions, the topics addressed at the meeting included a prelimi-
nary draft of a proposed Supplemental Rule G to govern civil forfeiture actions; an
interim report from the Federal Judicial Center on filing sealed settlement agree-
ments; a report by the Discovery Subcommittee on possible amendments to address
discovery of computer-based information; a report by the Class Action Subcommittee;
a suggestion that a new rule be considered to describe practice when district court
relief is sought from an order that is the subject of a pending appeal; and possible
amendments of Rules 15 and 50(b). See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 62.
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cess continues, these proposals will be reviewed to determine whether
some can suitably be advanced for adoption on a separate track that
runs parallel to the style proposals and that aims for adoption at the
same time as the style proposals. The advantages of this approach are
to address the issues while they are fresh in mind and to reduce the
temptation to amend the newly styled rules immediately after they
take effect. The potential disadvantages are diffusion and perhaps
confusion of the public comment process and the risk that substantive
changes adopted at the same time as style changes will blur the dis-
tinction between substance and style as the new rules are assimilated
into daily practice. These concerns are likely to curtail the number of
substantive changes proposed in direct combination with the Style
Project, advancing only those that seem right beyond any reasonable
controversy.
G. Redundant Reassurances
The Style Project forces reconsideration of a powerful drafting
reflex. Time and again, we persuade ourselves that it is wise to add
words we believe to be unnecessary. The purpose may be to anticipate
and forestall predictable misreadings-predictable because we do not
trust people to apprehend the "plain meaning," or because we do not
trust people to admit to a plain meaning they do not like. Instead, the
purpose may be to provide reassurance. Rule 4(j) (2), for example,
provides for "[s]ervice upon a state, municipal corporation, or other
governmental organization subject to suit."78 There is no need to add
"subject to suit." Rule 4 prescribes the method of service, and does
not purport to address such matters as Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity or sovereign immunity. But these words protect against argu-
ments that Rule 4 somehow limits sovereign immunity, and reassures
those who fear that the arguments will be made. Or perhaps the reas-
surance is aimed in a different direction, to show that there is no pur-
pose to authorize suit against an "organization" that is not an entity
capable of suing or being sued under the law that halfway created it.
Redundant cross-references provide a more general illustration.
By its own terms, Rule 11 applies to "[e]very pleading."79 Rules
8(b) (1) and (e) (2) are among those that add redundant reference to
"the obligations set forth in Rule 11."80 Rule 26(b)(2) immediately
follows Rule 26(b) (1), but a cross-reference to (b) (2) was deliberately
added to (b) (1) in the 2000 amendments "to emphasize the need for
78 FED. R. Crv. P. 4(j)(2).
79 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
80 FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
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active judicial use of subdivision (b) (2) to control excessive discov-
ery."8' The voice of drafting reason says that such cross-references
add distracting clutter. An excitable drafter may argue that they im-
plicitly dilute application of the cross-referenced rule in all circum-
stances that lack the cross-reference. But time and again, veteran
lawyers and judges fight for the redundant cross-reference because ex-
perience tells them that it reinforces awareness and application of the
rule invoked.
In face of these competing arguments, should we adopt a general
policy that prohibits intentional redundancy? That sets a high thresh-
old? Or that permits redundancy whenever at least a few fear that
language plain to the drafter may not be plain to all?
H. Integration with Other Rules: Style
As the third in time, the Civil Rules Style Project must honor style
conventions developed in the Appellate Rules Project and hardened
in the Criminal Rules Project. But it may be asked whether some de-
partures may be allowed.
Apart from style projects, the Standing Committee has long fa-
vored adopting identical language for rules that address the same sub-
ject unless a substantive reason can be shown for distinguishing civil
practice from some other practice. But the approach has been rela-
tively flexible: at times justification can be found in the view that
somehow the civil problem feels different. The "plain error" provi-
sion in revised Civil Rule 51, for example, was redrafted in a number
of steps that culminated in adoption of the plain error language of
Criminal Rule 52.82 But the Committee Note states that application of
the rule may be affected by the differences between criminal and civil
contexts.8 3 Would it be better to adopt deliberately different lan-
guage when different meanings may be appropriate, even though we
cannot articulate the differences?
The case for uniform expression across the several sets of rules
seems still more compelling when the question seems to involve style
conventions alone. Adherence to the same modes of expression
across the rules will facilitate understanding. Unshakable stability has
great virtue, yet it seems a shame to freeze style conventions. Contin-
81 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 390 (2000).
The Note further observes that: "The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts
have not implemented these [(b) (2)] limitations with the vigor that was contem-
plated." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1) advisory committee's note (2000 amend.).
82 Compare FED. R. Cirv. P. 51 (d) (2), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
83 FED. R. CIv. P. 51 advisory committee's note.
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ued improvement is possible and will be inevitable unless we erect an
impermeable barrier. And it does not seem likely that even a vigilant
style review process will be able to stem all departures-whether or
not improvements-as the full set of restyled rules are amended for
substantive improvement. There may be some room to adopt new
style conventions for the Civil Rules despite some departure from the
conventions used in the Appellate and Criminal Rules.
I. Integration with Other Rules: Content
Civil Rule 5(a) now requires service of every "designation of re-
cord on appeal. '8 4 Appellate Rule 10 is a self-contained provision
dealing with the record on appeal; it includes a service requirement,
and it does not seem to require designation.85 There may be archaic
provisions like this that have to be weeded out. This prospect does
not seem to present any distinctive policy question-the Style Project
simply must be alert to the risk.
Deeper problems may arise from other relationships between the
Civil Rules and counterpart provisions in other rules. Several Civil
Rules address evidence questions, including particularly Rules 32, 43,
44, and 80. The complex relationships between these rules and the
Evidence Rules have seemed to present issues that cannot be resolved
in the name of style alone. If they are to be confronted, it must be in
a separate project undertaken in conjunction with the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee.
J "Committee Notes"
One of the central difficulties of the style enterprise is that new
words are capable of bearing new meanings. Advocates will seize on
every nuance and attempt to wring advantage from it. In the first
years, the effort often will be willful: the advocate knows what the
prior language was, knows what it had come to mean, and knows that
no change in meaning was intended. As time passes, memory of the
Style Project will fade. New meaning will be found without any aware-
ness of the earlier language or meaning. In part that will be a good
thing: substantive changes will be made because the new meaning is
better than perpetuating the old. We cannot effectively prevent that
process, and we may not wish to. But the committee notes are a vehi-
cle for attempting to restrain these impulses. No doubt the notes will
vanish from sight, and with them the reminders they might provide.
84 FED. R. CIv. P. 5(a).
85 See FED. R. App. P. 10.
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Still, there might be advantage in writing extensive notes to elaborate
the meanings that are supposed to be clear in the restyled rules. This
temptation has been resisted. The note to each rule states that the
changes are matters of style alone. Many notes say no more. Some
notes undertake to explain that the new clear expression simply cap-
tures the meaning of former uncertain expression.
Another temptation has been resisted as well. The Style Project
might provide occasion to depart from the rule that the Advisory
Committee cannot change a note without amending the rule. The
involuntary plaintiff provision of Rule 19 is an example. This provi-
sion has a history that suggests a very narrow application.8 6 The face
of the rule, however, has no apparent limit. Any attempt to revise the
rule will encounter grave difficulty, but it might be useful to attempt
to reduce the occasions for inadvertent misapplication by a reminder
in the note. The note could observe that no change has been made in
the inherited language because it is difficult to state the intended lim-
its, but that it is important to remember the intended limits. Restate-
ments of present law are inherently dangerous, however, and in any
event would distract attention from the core challenges of the project.
They will not be attempted.
K. When Words Change Their Meaning
A particularly awkward question arises when traditional words are
caught up in new fashions that may change meaning. Rule 12(h) (1),
for example, lists defenses that are "waived" if not properly raised.8 7
Beginning with criminal procedure, however, it is increasingly fash-
ionable to distinguish between waiver and forfeiture. "Forfeiture" re-
sults from failure to timely raise an issue, and may be partly forgiven
by allowing review for plain error.88 "Waiver," on the other hand, is
the intentional surrender of a known right and may be denied even
plain error review.89 Which concept is appropriate to Rule 12(h) (1)?
Clearly it intends to cover nonintentional, inadvertent procedural for-
feiture. Will that meaning be lost if future generations view "waiver"
only as intentional surrender of a known right? But if "forfeit" is sub-
stituted today, will this seemingly harsh word generate confusion and
immediate meaning changes? The cautious approach no doubt is
wise, retaining current language without attempting to predict future
word fashions.
86 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87 FED. R. Cry. P. 12(h)(1).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107, 129 n.16 (2d Cir. 2003).
89 Id.
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L. Forms
What should be done to restyle the forms? Many of the forms use
antique dates for illustration-perhaps the most familiar is the June 1,
1936 date in Form 9.90 That date recurs throughout the forms. Fix-
ing that is easy enough. Perhaps further style changes also are desira-
ble. But here again substantive concerns quickly appear. The most
obvious example is the Form 17 complaint for copyright infringe-
ment, which has not been amended since 1948, long before the trans-
formation of copyright law by the 1976 Copyright Act. The Forms will
be styled after the rules are done. Present plans call for completion of
the forms in time for publication during the period set for comment-
ing on the rules.
M. Statutory References
The Rules occasionally refer to specific federal statutes. The "ap-
plicability" provisions of Rule 81 provide many examples. 91 The risks
of this practice are apparent-it may be difficult to be sure that the
initial reference is accurate, and statutes may change. But there may
be real advantages. Specific statutory provisions may be the least am-
biguous means of expression, particularly in the Rule 81 statements
that identify proceedings that do-or do not-come within the Rules.
The Criminal Rules Committee suggested that specific references
might be helpful in pointing toward the proper statute, saving re-
search time and reducing anxiety. The answer may be to refer to spe-
cific statutes only when necessary. Perhaps some showing of great
convenience should be allowed as well. But great care remains
appropriate.
CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR COMMENT
The Style Project is an ambitious undertaking. It has come far
enough to show that it will succeed. The full measure of success will
be assured, however, only if the bench and bar make the effort to
examine the restyled rules with punctilious care. Side-by-side reading
and comparison are required. It may be too much to ask any one
person to assume this responsibility for every rule. But everyone has a
favorite rule or two, whether the favor be love or hate. Begin with
those and comment, even if the comment is only to say that the
restyled version got it right. Beyond that, examine the relatively small
number of Committee Notes that add explanations to the universal
90 FED. R. Civ. P. app. of forms, form 9.
91 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81
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style-only disclaimer. The burden is not great and the payoff may be
valuable. Finally, pick a rule or a few to examine out of idle curiosity.
Who knows what wonders may be revealed as many trained minds ran-
domly explore the more obscure comers of this fascinating procedu-
ral machine?
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